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“VALUE ENGINEERING…?” – CHANGES DURING CONSTRUCTION 
 
Maral Papazian Bedian, P.E. 
PERINI Corporation, Civil Construction 






“Value Engineering” is a frequently found clause in Construction contracts in the USA, allowing contractor-initiated design changes. 
Misleading is the interpretation of “value engineering” to imply cost savings shared with the owner, and its implementation during 
construction, is problematic. It is not surprising that such a clause would simply be ignored because it involves changes in design, 
often major changes in very short time; and change is feared and vehemently resisted by all parties, owner, designer, and contractor. 
The problem may lie in the divergence and separation of the designer/engineer and builder/contractor; their priorities and incentives 
are very different. The engineer spends years, even decades, in design and prepares contract documents often without a deep-seated 
understanding of construction methods, including geotechnical construction. Even worse, given extensive computational 
advancements, the designer submits exaggerated code-based designs with excessive safety factors. As for the contractor, he often 
builds without full appreciation of design principles or regard for design engineers. Owner budget and schedule constraints (not 
commensurate with his demands) and the ever-increasing litigious climate have exacerbated the situation. Adverse and hostile 
relationship between the various groups is often the norm with extended disputes and claims, not to mention the costs these entail. 
Redesign to apply a new technology or optimization of an inferior design just before construction becomes unthinkable. Four case 




    
Four case histories (spanning from 1998 to 2002) are 
presented, where major design changes were implemented in 
record speed during construction of several very large projects 
in the metropolitan New York area. They include, two 
Design/Build projects: Case History 1) the redesign of large 
diameter drilled shafts for the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail 
Transit System ($1.1 billion total value and $343 million for 
the Initial Operating Segment for this case); Case History 2) 
the elimination of deep caissons in favor of spread footings for 
a new $90 million MTA bus depot in Manhattan; and, two 
conventional Design/Bid/Build projects: Case History 3) 
maintaining in lieu of removal of a 100-year old abutment of 
the $72 million  Queens Boulevard Bridge Replacement; Case 
History 4) the complete redesign of major retaining walls and 
actual use, for the first time outside Asia, of the “Giken” 
tubular pressed-in pipe piles as very high cantilever retaining 
walls, for the $150 million expansion of the Long Island 
Expressway. 
 
Before describing the four case histories, it is noted that 
projects of such large magnitude involve armies of people 
with different backgrounds. For many, their basis of 
experience in design and/or construction is largely to follow 
codes and specifications and paper tracking has become the 
occupation for many more. Most of the parties involved in 
large projects do not feel the need nor have the incentive to 
consider cost-effective solutions. Often, they are not even 
aware that changes are necessary or possible. Moreover, in a 
litigious society such as in the USA, liability concerns impede 
innovation, much less implementing design changes once 
construction has begun. In their attempt to be “safe”, many do 
not advocate or employ the very advances that are presented 
and discussed in journal articles and conferences. Owner 
budget constraints — not commensurate with his demands — 
and fast-track schedules — often unrealistic — have 
exacerbated the situation. 
 
It is perhaps helpful to mention that the “valuable 
engineering” design changes for the cases described herein are 
the personal account of a geotechnical engineer “defecting” to 
the construction side (where a possibility for adequate change 
could be detected), combined with the least welcome attitude 
of a female passion and insistence. The process of change was 
unconventional, painful, and even comical.   
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CASE HISTORY 1 – Hudson-Bergen Light Rail Transit System, New Jersey: 






The Hudson-Bergen Light Rail Transit System is a 33 Km 
Design-Build-Operate-Maintain light rail project in northern 
New Jersey. The Initial 16 Km of the project extends through 
Jersey City and includes a 0.8 Km long viaduct, a multiple-
span bridge carrying the light rail in a north-south direction 
just west of the Hudson River. Near the mid-length, the bridge 
crosses over the entrance to Holland Tunnel leading to 
Manhattan, New York.   
 
For the multi-span Newport viaduct, deep foundations 
including drilled shafts (bored piles) were selected with loads 
ranging from 4,450 KN to 16,300 KN (500 to 1,800 tons) 
from each pier. (In general, the design/build team followed the 
original bid reference documents including project design 
criteria, as well as mandated codes and specifications.) The 
initial design required the drilled shafts to extend through a 
thick zone of “completely weathered rock” and then be 
socketed into “sound” sandstone. The assigned design 
parameters were generally consistent with the bid reference 
documents, a unit end bearing resistance for rock of 0.8 MPa 
(8 tsf), increased to 1.2 MPa (12 tsf) after minimum 3 m 
penetration into “sound” bedrock. For “sound” rock, an 
allowable unit shaft resistance of 275 KPa (2.9 tsf) was 
specified. 
 
The subsurface conditions along the bridge alignment consist 
of an upper 6 m thick granular fill over 3 m soft marine clay, 
underlain by 12 m of medium dense to very dense glacial 
deposits comprised of alternating layers of silty sands with 
gravel to clayey silts.  Weathered sandstone, with an average 
thickness of about 7 m and described in the test boring logs as 
“completely weathered rock”, extends below the glacial 
deposits with SPT-N values of 100 blows for only 25 mm to 
150 mm penetration. Sandstone bedrock exists below a depth 
of about 28 m. The groundwater table at this site is shallow 
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The Change 
 
The initial design for the drilled shaft foundations supporting 
the viaduct was questioned by this author, given the highly 
variable nature of the sandstone rock and the implications of 
searching for “sound” sandstone at great depths. Encouraged 
by recent studies of intermediate geomaterials (O’Neill et al., 
1996), it was deemed unnecessarily conservative to bypass the 
weathered sandstone in search of deeper “sound” rock. Also, a 
report (Baker, 1988) on foundations for an adjacent 30-story 
office tower supported on 1.2 m diameter drilled shafts in the 
“completely weathered rock” zone showed resistances that 
were substantially higher than what was specified for “sound” 
rock. The report contained two conventional head-down static 
loading tests that measured unit toe resistance ranging from 
7.8 MPa (80 tsf) @ 35 mm movement, to 10.4 MPa (108 tsf) 
@ 15 mm movement. The higher unit toe resistance was 
measured in the upper parts of the weathered layer having SPT 
N-indices of 100 for only 150 mm penetration. From the same 
loading tests, a unit shaft resistance of 2.2 MPa (23 tsf) had 
been deduced for the weathered material.  
 
With the above and other design information at hand, the 
initial simplistic design was rejected and higher design values 
for the weathered rock were implemented subject to 
verification in full-scale static loading tests. The intent of the 
testing was to demonstrate that the drilled shafts can be 
supported on top of or just within the “Weathered Sandstone”, 
believed to provide adequate shaft and toe resistances to 
support the bridge column loads. More important, the testing 
was also intended to evaluate the impact of the proposed 
construction procedures on the axial capacity of the drilled 
shafts. Because of the large design loads, the Osterberg-cell 
(O-cell) test method was selected. 
 
It is perhaps not a surprise that the above change was strongly 
resisted by all parties involved, including the designers, whose 
“safe” design in “sound” rock was challenged. What was not 
anticipated, at least by the author, was the drilled-shaft 
subcontractor’s reluctance to accept “reduced drilling 
quantities”. The first loading test with the O-cell was not 
successful because of premature mobilization of shaft 
resistance caused by excessive drilling disturbances. However, 
after making all the necessary adjustments/refinement in the 
construction procedures, the second loading test, which 
immediately followed, achieved the intended “valuable” 





Principles of the O-cell method can be found elsewhere 




In summary, the testing is conducted from bottom up with the 
use of a sacrificial hydraulic jack — i.e. the Osterberg Cell, 
placed near the base of the shaft to be tested.  As the O-cell 
expands, it pushes the shaft upward and the base downward. 
Unlike the classic head-down static loading test, the O-cell 
allows the separate measurements of load-movement behavior 
of the shaft and the base. The upward load movement is 
governed by the shear resistance characteristics of the soil or 
rock along the shaft, whereas the downward load movement is 
governed by the compressibility of the soil or rock below the 
shaft toe (Fellenius et al., 1999). 
 
For this project, the O-cell loading test was conducted on one 
of the central (2.15 m in diameter) drilled shafts, which was 
prepared as a production caisson. The subsurface profile at the 
test location, as determined from a nearby test boring and as 
observed from the drill cuttings, consisted of 4.6 m thick 
granular fill, over 5.5 m marine clay, underlain by 10.8 m 
glacial deposits of silty sands with gravel. What had been 
described in a nearby boring as “completely weathered rock” 
at about 21 m depth below the existing grade, was recovered 
as a 1 m diameter solid sandstone core (Photo 1.1), 
immediately underlain by soil-like, completely weathered 
rock. The test shaft was advanced about 3 m into the 
weathered sandstone. The total length of the test shaft was 




Photo 1.1 - Recovered 1m diameter Core from the 
“Completely Weathered Rock” zone 
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The test shaft (as well as all the remaining 44 production 
shafts with diameters ranging from 2.15 m to 2.75 m) was 
constructed using the slurry method to maintain a stable hole. 
Drilling began with soil augers to 1.5 m depth before 
introducing the polymer slurry, followed by further drilling 
and installing a slightly oversized 10 m long temporary casing 
to support the upper fill and marine clay.  Both soil and rock 
augers were used to advance the shaft below the temporary 
casing and through the glacial soils. The slurry level inside the 
shaft was maintained approximately 1.5 m above the outside 
groundwater level, just below the existing ground surface.  
 
Once weathered rock was reached, a permanent steel casing 
(Photo 1.2) with welded teeth was inserted into the shaft and 
twisted for about 0.3 m into the weathered sandstone. Drilling 
below the permanent casing was then continued at slightly 
reduced 2 m diameter using rock augers, sometimes assisted 
with core barrels to core the harder rock. For the test shaft, the 
length of the socket extending into the weathered sandstone 
was 2.5 m.  The sides of the socket were scraped to remove 
softened material. At the end of drilling, the bottom of the 
socket was cleared of cuttings and accumulated sediments 
were removed using a clean-out bucket. It was estimated that 
approximately 25 mm of sediments remained at the base of the 
test shaft before beginning the O-cell static loading test.  
Following drilling and clean-out of the test shaft, three 533 
mm (21 inch) diameter sacrificial O-cells (welded and 
contained between two circular steel plates, and mounted on a 
steel frame), were lowered to the bottom of the test shaft 




Photo 1.3. – Three O-Cells between two steel plates 
 
 




Photo 1.4. – The O-Cell assembly, complete with 
Instrumentation being lowered to the bottom of the prepared 
Drilled Shaft (before concreting) 
 
 
The three O-cells were capable of applying a total combined 
load of 34,200 KN (3,845 tons). The O-cell assembly was 
complete with instrumentation including sister bar vibrating 
wire strain gages at three levels along the shaft, to measure the 
shaft resistance (side shear load transfer) in the various layers.   
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Once the O-cell assembly was positioned inside the test shaft, 
concrete placement by pumping from the bottom up 
proceeded, until the level reached to within 2.2 m below the 
final head level. (The upper 2.2 m part of the shaft was later 
reinforced and concreted monolithic with the bridge pier. It is 
noted that the design optimization had also eliminated the use 
of full-length reinforcing cages; instead, the drilled shafts 
consisted of 16 mm thick permanent steel casing filled with 
34.5 MPa (5,000 psi) concrete, and a steel reinforcement cage 
limited to the upper 2.2 m part of the shaft.)  
 
Following placement of the concrete, the annulus between the 
outer temporary casing and the inner permanent casing in the 
top 10 m of the shaft was grouted via a tremie pipe and the 
temporary casing was gradually pulled as grout filled the void 
that was created during drilling.  
 
The O-cell static loading test was performed by Loadtest Inc., 
on December 21, 1998, five days after placement of the shaft 
concrete and its attainment of the necessary compressive 
strength. The quick loading test procedure was followed and 
readings of all gages were obtained at 1, 2 and 4 minutes for 
each of the 14 loading increments. The three O-cells were 
pressurized to a total test load of 20,600 KN (2,315 tons) (half 
upward and half downward). The loading was halted when it 
was determined that the side shear in the overburden soils 











Based on the results of the O-cell static loading test, the total 
upward movement of the shaft was 4.6 mm at a maximum 
upward net load (gross load minus the buoyant weight of the 
shaft) of 9,300 KN (1,040 tons). The total downward 
movement of the shaft base at the maximum downward gross 
load (net load plus buoyant weight of shaft) of 10,300 KN 
(1160 tons) was 4.5 mm. This movement is only 0.2% of the 
shaft socket base diameter of 2 meter. Because of such small 
base movement and no apparent creep, it can be concluded 
that the ultimate end-bearing resistance of the shaft founded in 
the “completely weathered sandstone” was never reached.  
 
The interpreted average unit bearing resistance in the 
weathered sandstone at the measured nominal 4.5 mm 
movement was 3.35 MPa (35 tsf). While not approaching its 
anticipated ultimate capacity, this deduced unit bearing 
resistance in the “completely weathered rock” was much 
higher than the bid design value, of 0.8 MPa to 1.2 MPa (8 to 
12 tsf), specified for “sound” rock.  
 
It is further noted that the unit shaft resistances measured 
during the loading with the O-cells, were lower than measured 
for the previously described conventional head-down static 
loading tests at the nearby office tower. This could be due to 
that, in a conventional head-down test the instrumentation will 
not measure the load locked-in the pile (residual load) before 
the start of the test. When the residual load is neglected, the 
shaft resistance is overestimated. The use of polymer slurry 
and running the test only five days after drilling and 













Table 1 below summarizes the results of the Side Shear 
Transfer data for the various subsurface layers along the test 




Table 1. Side Shear Transfer from O-Cell Strain Gage Data 
 
Load Transfer Zone Unit Side Shear Resistance 
  
Grouted Zone outside 
Permanent Casing 
(upper ~ 9.3 m of  
overburden soils) 
30 KPa    (0.31 tsf) 
Non-Grouted Zone 
outside Permanent Casing 
(~11.6 m glacial soils; 
drilled under slurry) 
 6 KPa    (0.07 tsf) 
Upper ~1.7 m Socket in  
Weathered Sandstone 
(includes 0.3m casing 
 embedded into W.S.) 
333 KPa    (3.48 tsf) 
Lower ~ 1.1 m Socket in 
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Despite the strong resistance to change by the parties 
involved, the main objective of demonstrating that the 
“Weathered Sandstone” should not be bypassed in search of 
“Sound” rock was achieved. The Newport Viaduct is now 
supported on large diameter drilled shafts with only nominal 
1.5 m penetration or “sockets” in the “completely weathered 





The unnecessary search for “sound” sandstone at great depths 
was eliminated, together with unavoidable disputes and 
delays. In addition to considerable time and cost savings, the  
design change contributed to some valuable insight and 
experience in design and construction of large diameter drilled 
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CASE HISTORY 2.  –  100th Street Bus Depot, New York City: 







The 100th Street Bus Depot is a new five-story bus terminal for 
the New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) 
occupying one city block in Manhattan between 99th and 100th 
Streets, and between Lexington and Park Avenues. It replaces 
a former two-story garage, built in the 1890’s and initially 
used as a trolley-car barn. The new structure is a steel-framed 
building with concrete floors and includes a partial basement 
near its middle. The easternmost column line with design 
loads of 10 MN (1,125 tons) is within 1.5 m of the underlying 
multi-tube Lexington Avenue subway system.  
 
To support the new columns along the subway line, the project 
bid plans had called for 1 m diameter and 17 m deep caissons. 
The upper 14 m of each caisson unit would have required 
50 mm isolation from the surrounding rock thus transferring 
the column loads to below the base of the existing tunnel, via 
3 m long sockets in bedrock.  (This follows a routine 
requirement by MTA to prevent stress from being imposed on 
the roof and walls of their tunnels.)  
 
The bid documents contained extensive test boring 
information, which revealed that the project site was underlain 
by massive Manhattan mica Schist bedrock within just 3 m 
below street level. In fact, the Lexington Avenue two-level 
and multi-tube subway had been tunneled through this rock 
circa 1910, leaving an about 6 m thick solid rock roof over the 
upper-level subway (Fig. 2). The NX rock core recovery 
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The Bus Depot project was let as a design/build contract with 
a very aggressive fast-track schedule. Both the pre-bid 
preliminary design and the subsequent final design by the 
Contractor’s own hired design engineers relied heavily on 
very restrictive codes, including unnecessarily conservative 
approaches to seismic design. Any suggestion for value 
engineering change was undesirable and was strongly resisted. 
Yet, objecting to the blind reliance on codes in foundation 
design, the author questioned the real need for the deep 
caissons to support the columns along the subway. The 
unsupported statement that no stresses from the new structure 
can be imposed on the roof and walls of the adjacent tunnel 
was not sufficient reason for a deep foundation design.  
 
Unconvinced that deep shafts were necessary, the author 
rushed to MTA’s warehouse where many rows of the project 
rock core boxes were neatly stacked. Careful inspection and 
some simple testing of the rock cores with the blows of a 
geologic hammer gave support to the reservations about the 
design. Later, as expected, the schist bedrock at this site was 
found to be hard to very hard with unconfined compressive 
strength values estimated to range from at least 70 MPa to 
over 100 MPa (10,000 psi to 15,000 psi). The tensile strength 
of the rock was assessed to be minimum 5 MPa (750 psi). 
 
It may be necessary to mention here that prior to the bid, more 
than 40 deep test borings including extensive coring of the 
rock had been carried out.  However, not a single test was 
conducted on the cores to determine the strength of the rock. It 
is discouraging to realize that in this and in many other 
projects, test borings are performed to simply satisfy code 
requirements. Then, the boring logs become just part of the 
bid package for the contractor to review and, in essence, to 
become responsible and liable for the subsurface conditions 
encountered. It is further noted that contract specifications 
including this project, often demand requirements such as “no 
damage”, “no movement” or “no vibration”, thereby shifting 






It is not surprising that such shifting of liability has resulted in 
unwarranted contingency for the contractor and is a source of 
claims and disputes. The need for careful evaluation of all 
aspects of a project, from inception to construction 
completion, including the very often-neglected 
structure/foundation interaction could perhaps alleviate some 





Convinced that deep foundations were not warranted for the 
100th Street Bus Depot because good hard rock was so 
shallow, the fight for using shallow footings instead, began. At 
the pre-construction meeting, the author rolled a sample of the 
drilled rock core onto the conference table to show the more 
than 25 attendees what actually lay beneath the surface. An 
unrelenting argument was presented, dramatizing the nominal 
stresses on the roof and walls of the tunnel induced by shallow 
spread footings supported only on top of bedrock, as opposed 
to the substantial stresses caused due to drilling of the 
specified deep shafts so very near the tunnel (Fig. 2). To 
overcome the tensile strength and actually cut the hard rock,  
by drilling or coring, large axial forces and a substantial torque 
from the drilling machine would be required, it was argued. 
These drilling induced stresses immediately adjacent to the 
tunnel would be at least ten times larger than the maximum 
stresses induced from a shallow spread footing, under extreme 
loading condition, including the code-based unrealistically 
large seismic loads. It was, therefore, clear that the strict 
limitations imposed by the bid regarding impact on the 
adjacent tunnel were not realistic, nor were they consistent. 
   
Conclusion 
 
Eventually, the deep caissons were eliminated and shallow 
spread footings on top of the mica schist bedrock were used to 
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CASE HISTORY 3 – Reconstruction of Queens Boulevard Bridge, New York: 





The reconstruction of the 100-year old Queens Boulevard 
Bridge (QBB) for the New York City Department of 
Transportation was let as a conventional design-bid-build 
contract with a very aggressive schedule. The QBB is a major 
bridge crossing Sunnyside railroad yard where an extensive 
network of railway tracks is in constant use. Immediately 
above the QBB runs the New York City Transit Authority 
“elevated subway” line, leading to the underground subway 
system in Manhattan. The QBB itself is situated in one of the 
most congested areas of Queens, NY. This, combined with an 
active railway system 7 m below the bridge, and an active 
train system less than 9 m above the bridge, can make any 
construction activity in the middle a very difficult task. These 
physical constraints are further complicated because different 
agencies own and operate the various infrastructures.  
 
The contract bid plans had specified the complete removal and 
replacement of the bridge superstructure and the complete 
removal and replacement of only one of the abutments, the 
South Abutment. The foundations of all the existing 18 
intermediate piers and the north abutment were to be 
maintained.  
The existing south abutment is a 30 m long concrete gravity 
structure with shallow spread footing (Fig. 3a). The north 
abutment and the intermediate piers are supported on timber 
piles. 
Fig. 3a – Typical Section at South Abutment of Queens Boulevard Bridge
 
The contract had called for replacing the existing south 
abutment with a new reinforced concrete structure, supported 
on deep concrete-filled steel pipe piles. For removal and 
replacement of the existing abutment, the bid plans had 
specified an excavation support system comprised of soldier 
piles / lagging, with tiebacks. This excavation support system 
was in very close proximity to the deep foundations of the 
existing overhead “elevated subway” bents, built circa 1915.  
 
The subsurface conditions at the 100-year old railroad yard 
within which all the foundations of  QBB are founded, are 
comprised of an upper 8 m thick silty sand fill, overlying a 1.5 
m thin layer of organic clayey silt with peat, over 15 m thick 
dense glacial deposits of silty sands and gravel, over schist 
bedrock (Fig. 3b). 
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Upon award of the construction contract, finding the reason 
behind the complete removal and replacement of only one of 
the twenty supporting elements of the new lighter 
superstructure of the QBB began. The complexity of the site 
and the very real potential for conflicts between such closely 
situated structures administered by so many different agencies 
provided ample reason to question the bid design. Indeed, 
except for one obvious crack, which was easily repairable, 
there did not appear to be much justification for the complete 
removal of the south abutment.  
 
Value engineering to maintain this gravity abutment with its 
shallow spread footing (in lieu of a new pile supported 
structure) was initiated, but it received an unbelievably fierce 
resistance. Unfortunately, this is an only too-common reaction 
whenever spread footings in lieu of deep foundations are 
proposed. Very often, deep foundations are selected without 
proper evaluation of constructability or impact due to 
construction. In many situations, shallow footings perform as 
well, if not better than deep foundations, yet they are 
consistently ignored. More recently, the excuse of “seismic 
consideration” is immediately presented without real 
understanding or evaluation of dynamic behavior.  
 
Despite the obstacles, however, saving the historic structure 
became a personal mission for the author. Extensive 
settlement, and static, dynamic, and liquefaction analyses were 





The record drawings of the existing South Abutment 
contained a valuable note indicating that the massive concrete 
gravity structure had experienced about 75 mm settlement 
during construction from May 1909 to October 1910. This was 
not unusual, because the abutment is underlain by a sandy fill 
layer, which probably was in a loose state some 100 years ago. 
(It is likely that the subsequent use of timber piles to support 





Since the bridge (including the south abutment) had remained 
in successful service for over 90 years, further settlements, if 
any must have been small. The probable cause for the 10 mm 
wide vertical crack in the abutment was differential settlement 
resulting from consolidation of the thin organic layer below 
the fill. However, after nearly 100 years, the structure had 
reached a complete state of equilibrium.  Furthermore, 
because the new loads from the replacement superstructure 
would be lighter than the one removed, no further settlements 
were to be anticipated.  It is noted that the net bearing stress 
on the foundation soils imposed by the existing or the new 
bridge do not exceed a nominal 100 KPa (1 tsf).   
 
The seismic analysis of the abutment proved to be very 
contentious. Efforts were not spared by the parties involved to 
impede the consistent conclusion that the existing abutment 
had adequate dynamic resistance. Even with unrealistic peak 
ground acceleration, and excessive seismic loads used in the 
extensive analyses (much higher than that assumed for the 
other elements of the same bridge), the dynamic performance 
of the abutment was still more than adequate.  
 
The “drama” of soil liquefaction and the suggestion that 1.2 m 
settlements would occur due to liquefaction, was even more 
unrealistic. Response analysis revealed that such settlements, 
if any would not exceed 25 mm under a “fictitious” 
Magnitude 6.5 Earthquake in Queens, New York. Ironically, 
the “elevated subway” bents above the subject abutment 
cannot withstand an earthquake magnitude of 5.0 or 5.5, 
typically assumed for this site.  
 
Moreover, the original bid design involving abutment removal 
had easily overlooked potential movements inherent with deep 
excavation and tieback installation, not to mention the 
vibrations from driving new piles, so near the vulnerable 





Needless to say, the South Abutment of the Queens Boulevard 
















CASE HISTORY 4 – Expansion of the Long Island Expressway, New York: 







The expansion of the ever-congested Long Island Expressway 
(LIE) over Cross Island Parkway (CIP) just outside 
Manhattan, New York included numerous retaining walls and 
several deep cuts for bridge expansions. The bid plans for this 
conventional design/bid/build project contained complete 
designs for both permanent retaining walls and temporary 
excavation support systems.   
 
The main specified retaining wall and support method 
consisted of very deep, 1 m diameter drilled-in soldier 
piles/lagging, complemented with tiebacks or bracing. 
Unusually heavy (over 1000 kg/m), and very long (25 m) 
H-beams with welded-on cover plates were specified. To 
install such beams, deep drilling in granular soils below the 
water table, would have been required 
 
Soon after start of construction in the fall of 2000, serious 
supply problems for the specified heavy beams ensued. It 
became necessary to explore alternative systems for at least 
three major structures:  a 78 m long permanent retaining wall 
SP-1 at maximum 8.5 m height; an excavation system to 
support an 11 m deep cut for construction of the new westerly 
abutment of the LIE bridge over CIP; and an excavation 
system to support a 9 m deep cut for the reconstruction of the 
abutments of Marathon Parkway Bridge over LIE. 
 
The subsurface conditions at this site are characterized as 
terminal moraine glacial deposits consisting of medium dense, 
becoming very dense with depth, sands and gravel with 
varying proportions of silt, frequent cobbles, and numerous 





For this case, a value engineering change proposal was 
welcomed by the owner (New York State Department of 
Transportation, NYSDOT.)  As usual, the fast track schedule 
of this major project and producing a new design during 
construction became a challenge, requiring the full and 
amicable cooperation of NYSDOT.  
 
Interestingly, the beginning of redesign and the value 
engineering process for the LIE retaining walls coincided with 
an international conference on deep foundations in New York 
City on October 5 to 7, 2000. Agonizing over the strict 
limitations imposed by NYSDOT not only on soil parameters, 
but also on their requested design methodology based on 
codes, the author felt compelled to openly express her 
frustration with some of the attendees at that conference which 
apparently included the Giken “Press-in Method” 
representative. Thus, Giken responded to a request to provide 
“not just video animation or colorful brochures, but good 
technical literature”. Read and absorbed during that weekend, 
a presentation of the concept of the innovative technology was 
made to NYSDOT. In less than one week time following the 
conference, the complete redesign of one of the deep 
excavation support systems, in full cantilever, was submitted 
as value engineering change proposal. The installation of the 
permanent wall and the first phase of the two deep excavation 
support systems were completed in early July 2001. The 
second phase was completed in the spring of 2002. The Giken 
Press-in pipe piles system, a first outside the Far East, not only 
resolved the steel supply problem employing domestic 
lightweight pipe piles, but also allowed the use of the valuable 
soil-pile interaction design approach.   
 
 
Design and Installation 
 
The Giken “Press-in Method”, also known as the “Silent 
Piler” (because it is virtually noiseless and vibration-free), is 
described elsewhere (Bearss et al. 2002; ENR 2001; White et 
al. 2000). It uses constant outside diameter (ranging from 800 
mm to 1080 mm) open-ended steel pipe piles, which are 
pressed into the ground with a powerful hydraulic push piler. 
An initial “reaction stand” is required to install the first three 
piles. Thereafter, the piler literally rides over and grasps three 
piles, as it presses the next pile. (The reaction force to 
hydraulically press a subsequent pile is derived from the 
negative skin friction of previously installed piles.) The piles 
are nearly contiguous with maximum separation of 180 mm.  
This nominal gap is closed with welded-on Pipe-Tee (P-T) 
interlocks, or with flat bars. The pile installation is guided by 
laser beam resulting in remarkable small alignment deviation 
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For this project, a constant 914 mm outside diameter open-
ended steel pipe piles were pressed almost contiguously into 
the ground with a powerful 260 metric tonne capacity 
hydraulic push piler. The nominal gaps of 180 mm between 
adjacent piles were closed with shop-welded P-T interlocks in 
the case of the permanent wall, and with flat bars for the 
temporary support, extending a nominal 1.5 m below the 
excavation level. To aid in penetrating into the dense granular 
soils, two built-in water jets with maximum 7,000 KN/m2 
(1,000 psi) pressure per jet were used. The entire installation 
process was virtually without vibration or noise. The laser 




Photos 4.1 and 4.2  below show the Giken piler during 




Photo 4.1. – Begin of Installation of Pile with Giken Piler   
 







The 0.914 m outside diameter steel pipe piles possess 
significant bending resistance to lateral loads and as such, 
support in full cantilever of the deep cuts, was achieved — the 
most desirable excavation support system for a contractor. 
Deflection based methods for the analysis of piles under 
lateral loads (Reese et al. 1974; API 1993; Reese et al. 2000; 
Reese and Van Impe 2001), were employed and a parametric 
analysis was performed with varying loading and subsurface 
conditions. The total length and wall thickness of each pile 
was selected based on maximum allowable deflection at the 
pile head and allowable bending stresses in the pile itself. 
Consistently, the results of the analysis indicated that a depth 
of embedment for each pile about equal to the cantilever 
height would provide an adequate performance. In general, 
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Upon final excavation, measured movements at the pile heads 
were remarkably close to the predicted values (based on 
estimated p-y curves for the granular soils at this site.)  
 
Measured movements at the permanent wall were as per 
design, less than 25 mm.  
 
For the 10.7 m deep west abutment excavation where large 
movements (150 mm to 180 mm) were allowed, the maximum 
measured pile top movements were as follows (Fig. 4.1): 
along the centerline of LIE where 25 mm thick wall tubular 
piles were pressed-in, the maximum pile-head movement was 
125 mm.  Along the back of the new abutment where 17.5 mm 
thick wall piles were pressed-in, the average measured pile 
head movement was 161 mm.  
 
The total lateral pile head movements are inclusive of about 
25 mm deflection experienced by each tubular pile 
immediately following the driving of the new abutment pile 
foundations (324 mm diameter steel pipe piles) at the bottom 
of the cut. The additional movement was probably due to the 
pile driving vibration-induced temporary loosening / 
liquefaction of the submerged sands below the excavation, 





























Computed for 17.5mm th.
Pipe & Loose Sands
w/Concrete Fill behind top
1.5m of Wall
Measured Min. 155mm for
17.5mm th. Pipe Pile & Loose
Sands
Measured Max. 171mm for
17.5mm th. Pipe Pile & Loose
Sands
Measured Avg. 161mm for
17.5mm th. Pipe Pile & Loose
Sands
Computed for 17.5mm th.
Pipe & Loose Sands w/ 100
Ton Crane Surcharge 
Computed for 25mm th. Pipe
Pile & Loose Sands
Measured 125mm for 25mm
th. Pipe after New Abutment
Pile Driving
Computed for 25mm th. Pipe
Pile & Medium Dense Sands
Measured 101mm for 25mm
th. Pipe Pile before New
Abutment Pile Driving
            Bottom of Excavation
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Figures 4.2 and 4.3 below present the computed pile moment and mobilized soil reaction diagrams, respectively.  
 
10.7m Cantilever; 21.3m Long; 0.914m OD; 












































thick Pipe Pile & Loose
Sands w/Concrete Fill
behind top 1.5m portion
of Wall [Max. Stress in
17.5mm th. Steel Pipe
=184.56MPa (26.8Ksi);
Fy=345 MPa (50 Ksi)
Computed for 17.5mm
thick Pipe Pile & Loose
Sands W/ 100 Ton
Crane Surcharge [Max.
Stress in 17.5mm th.
Steel Pipe =188.24
MPa (27.3Ksi)
Computed for 25mm th.
Pipe Pile & Loose
Sands [Max. Stress in
25mm th. Steel Pipe
=153.52 MPa (22.3Ksi) 
Computed for 25mm th.
Pipe Pile &Medium
Dense Sands [Max.
Stress in 25mm th.




10.7m Cantilever; 21.3 Long; 0.914m OD; 





















































Fig. 4.2. – Computed Pile Moment Diagram 
 
 
Fig. 4.3. – Mobilized Soil Reaction below Excavation 
Photo 4.3 below shows an impressive view of the completed retaining wall in full cantilever at 10.7 m (35 foot) height, with average 
pile embedment of 10.7 m. 
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Photo 4.4. – 10.7m Full-Cantilever Support with “Giken” 
Pressed-in Tubular Steel Piles (note the driven and concreted 





Sound new technology and advanced geotechnical engineering 
design (considering soil/pile interaction) made this case 
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